The politics of government - NGO relations in Africa by Bratton, Michael
This work is licensed under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
NoDerivs 3.0 Licence. 
To view a copy of the licence please see: 
http://creativecommons.0rg/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/ 
THE POLITICS OF GOVERNMENT-NGO RELATIONS IN AFRICA 
Michael Bratton 
WORKING PAPER NO. 1+56 
INSTITUTE FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
UNIVERSITY OF NAIROBI 
P. 0. BOX 30197 
NAIROBI 
View expressed in th is paner are those o f the author, and 
should not be interpreted as r e f l e c t i ng the views of the 
Ins t i tu te f o r Development Sludies or the University of 
Nairobi. 
U3RARY 
- 7 J U N 1990 
DECEMBER 1987 
This paper has protection under the Copyright Act, Cap 130 
of the laws o f Keny?. 
16 t^ -- s u v ^ ^ 
& L,braryCemrc IDS/HP 456 
Falmer Brighton BN1 9RE, UK 
PLEASE RETURN BY: 
0Jx f M / | 
ABSTRACT 
Non-Government organizations (NGOs), deservedly or not, have 
established a reputation as the leadinn pract i t ioners o f the rural development 
in A f r i ca . Afr ican governments have responded ambiguously to the presence of 
these new agencies, on the one hand valueing the economic resources NGOs can 
ra ise , but res is t ing po l i t i c a l p lura l i zat ion implied by popular 
development action. The paper describes the growth o f NGOs in Afr ica and 
proposes a framework f o r analysing the dynamics of NGO-government relations. 
By means o f examples drawn mainly from Kenya and Zimbabwe, the paper 
i l l us t ra t e s the s t rateg ies used by governments to exercise control and NGfs to 
assert autonomy. An argument is made that the contribution o f NGOs to 
development, and the at t i tude o f governments towards the voluntary sector, are 
determined more by p o l i t i c a l than economic considerations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In retrospect , the 1980s nay turn out to he the "NGO decade" for 
rural development in A f r i ca . 'Recent organisational performance seems to 
suggest that non-government organizations (NGOs) have a comparative advantage 
over international donor agencies, national governments and private firms when 
i t comes to addressing the basic needs o f the rural poor. There is growing 
evidence in the l i t e r a tu r e on the developmental ro l e of the voluntary sector 
that NGOs can sometimes be e f f e c t i v e at al leviat ing, poverty and hunger. 
Operating with minimal resources on micro-projects in neglected regions, NGOs 
promise to strengthen rural people 's a b i l i t i e s to improve their own 
conditions. 
NGOs have entered the l imel ight as governments throughout Africa 
have begun to retr'eat from ambitious attempts to sponsor secioeconomic 
development "from above". A f t e r a quarter century o f central planning and 
notwithstanding substantial investments in education and health services, 
African governments have shown l imited capacity to raise rural standards of 
l i v i n g . Under the combined pressure o f growing international indebtedness and 
declining economic product iv i ty , public services in the African countryside 
have actual ly begun to break down. The devastating African famines of 1974 
and 1984 emphasised not only the apparent helplessness of some governments in 
the face o f natural catastrophe, but also the central.:ty of non-government 
organizations as conduits f o r r e l i e f and develonment assistance. Especially 
in the remotest regions of the African countryside, frovcrnments have often had 
l i t t l e choice but to cede respons ib i l i ty f o r the provision of basic services 
to a church, an indigenous s e l f -he lp groun, or an international re l ie f agency. 
A change in the cl imate of debate about international development 
pol icy has also helped to thrust NGOs into prominence at this time. There is 
an unusual conjunction o f ideas in which development theorists of diverse 
persuasions ar^ree on the ine f f ec t i veness o f the State and the need for 
ins t i tu t i ona l a l t e rnat i ves . From a " l e f t " perspect ive , nro^onents of popular 
part ic ipat ion in development perceive NGOs as an instrument of empowerment 
that w i l l enable " b ene f i c i a r i e s " to take control o f their own l ives (Friere 
1970; Hol lnste iner 1978; Gran 1983). Elements within this school are 
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disil lusioned, not only with State sponsorship, but with "developmentalism' 
i t s e l f . They point to evidence that economic growth and industrial ization is 
usually accomnanied by dependence, impoverishment and marginalization. They 
consider that sustainable development can only be achieved on the basis o f 
fu l l po l i t i ca l and economic participation by ordinary working fo lk . 
At the same time, NGOs have also found favour from the " r ight " and 
have benefitted from the current fashion for the privatization of development 
interventions (Berg 1981; USAID 1982; USAID 1886a). During the 1980s, 
o f f i c i a l b i latera l aid agencies and multi lateral lending institutions made 
assistance conditional upon the acceptance by host governments of "structural 
adjustment" policy reforms. Such reforms contain requirements for reduced 
economic intervention by governments and for the al location o f resources by 
market forces. While these donors may prefer the capi ta l is t firm as the 
organizational model for a reinviporated private sector, they have found that 
indigenous large-scale lusiness enterprises are few and far between in A f r i ca . 
The weakness of the private sector has led the development assistance 
community to explore the alternative of working through non-profit , voluntary 
institutions. 
At the heart of these debates is the issue of the kroner role of the 
State in c i v i l society and in economic development. Where does responsibi l i ty 
rest for the well-being of a nation's people? And how might inst i tut ional 
arrangements be made for sharing the enormous task of rural development? At 
base, the relationship letween governments and non-government organizations i s 
a po l i t i ca l question that impinges on the legitimacy o f various types o f 
institutions to exercise power. Who has the right to assert leadership, to 
organize people, and to a l locate resources in the development enterprise? 
The new prominence o f NGOs naturally attracts the attention o f 
public authorit ies. Whether NGOs are international r r community-based, a l l 
operate within the boundaries of a nation-state and at the Pleasure o f a 
sovereign government. Because governments res is t any reduction of the i r 
leadership role in development, they arc l i ke l y to attempt to condition the 
context for voluntary sector ac t i v i t y , for example hy enacting le~ 
- 3 - IDS/WF 4 56 
administrative regulations to control NGOs. On the other hand, NGOs are 
beginning to f ind themselves in a position to influence the way that 
governments conceptualize and implement development programs. The innovative 
NGO ideology challenges the conventional wisdom of "what works" and raises 
issues that are r i gh t fu l l y part of a puKLic policy debate on rural 
development. Governments and NGOs therefore find themselves interacting in 
new ways that requircs both parties to think careful ly about how to handle any 
conf l ic ts that might ar ise . 
The present paper attempts to open a discussion about the po l i t i ca l 
relations between governments and non-rovernmental development agencies. 
Following some introductory material, the naper is divided into two parts, one 
conceptual, the other empirical. 
In Part One, I propose a framework for analysing rovernment-NGO 
re lat ions. I describe the d i f f e rent •political and organizational 
characteristics o f public and voluntary agencies witb a view to understanding 
the dynamics that drive each type of inst i tut ion. I subseouently ident i fy the 
factors that a f f e c t the relations between governments and NGOs - - including 
the type o f governance system and the type o f voluntary ac t i v i t y . The key 
issue explored is the po l i t i ca l tension between government's urre f o r order 
and control and the NGO quest fo r organizational autonomy. 
Part "Two applies this conceptual framework to an analysis o f the 
prevalent trends in government control and NGO response in sub-Saharan A f r i ca . 
I i dent i f y -and describe the range of regulatory mechanisms actually employed 
by governments — monitoring, coordination, cooptation, dissolution - - and the 
var iet ies of reaction that NGOs evince — low p r o f i l e , se lect ive 
col laboration, and policy advocacy. A series of capsule case examples 
provides supporting empirical data, mostly from East and Southern A f r i ca and 
notably frcm Kenya and Zimbabwe. 
The Growth of NGOs 
Afr ica has a long history of organized voluntary action which helps 
to explain the continent's recept iv i ty to NGOs today. In preco lon ia l 
times, po l i t i c a l organization was integrated within a social network o f 
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kinship obl igat ions incurred through the structure of the extended family. 
Individuals were expected to share food, labour and productive assets with 
relatives and had a r ight in return to expect livelihood support from others 
while chie fs were able to compel commoners to t i l l their f ields — that i s , by 
ca l l ing upon the authority of the t rad i t iona l State — the most typical form 
of organization was voluntary and reciprocal exchange among equals. 
During the colonial period, the State stood aloof from rural 
development and concentrated on the regulatory functions of maintaining law 
and order. Nor.-government organizat ions, in the form of churches and 
missionary soc i e t i e s , were the pr incipal providers of health and education 
serv ices , especia l ly in the undeveloped hinterland. Only at the eleventh hour 
of co lonial rule , in belated reaction to nationalist political agitation, did 
the State assume respons ib i l i ty f o r development services. Government 
att itudes to NGOs in the co lonia l period ranged from laissez-faire to attempts 
to sever the l inks between the church mission system and the nationalist 
movement. S i gn i f i c an t l y , A f r i c a ' s f i r s t modern NGOs sprang up during this 
period in the form o f ethnic wel fare associations vihich articulated the social 
demands o f newly-urbanized Afr icans. Such NGOs formed the building blocks of 
nat ional is t p o l i t i c a l parties and played an expl ic i t ly polit ical role in 
contesting, the authority o f the co lon ia l government. 
In the post-co lonia l peri<-d, NGO development programs have 
mushroomed. The .Organization o f Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 
considers that up to 6,000 IIGOs exist worldwide, though breakdowns cf this 
f i gure by continent and country are d i f f i c u l t to come by (OECD, 1981; Gorman, 
1984; InterAct ion, 1986). According to best estimates, more than 400 NGOs of 
a l l types operate in Kenya, up from 125 in 1974 (USAID, 1986b; KNCSS 1987). 
counting only those organizations that belonc to o f f i c i a l NGO coordinating 
bodies, there are at l eas t 45 registered MGOs in Ethiopia, 94 in Uganda, and 
80 in Zimbabwe (TnterAct ion, 1989). In most African countries NGOs deliver a 
s i gn i f i cant proportion of health services — UP to 35 percent in Kenya -- and 
are of ten the only service agencies operating in the remoter rural areas. 
Durinr the widespread drought o f the early 1980s, for example, indigenous 
and international NGOs mounted coordinated food re l i e f efforts across the 
continent that predated s imilar government programs by many months. 
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The term ''NGO" embraces a range o f organizations o f diverse s^ale 
and character. Three pr incipal categories can be i d en t i f i ed . F i r s t , there 
are community-based associations which have a small and intimate membership, 
are run by the members themselves, and re ly on l imited amounts o f primari ly 
local resources. Second, there are national! NGOs whose small professional 
staffs provide support services - - in the form o f management t ra in ing , 
information exchange, or pol icy representation — to the grassroots 
organizations below. F ina l l y , there are international r e l i e f and development 
agencies which have la rge professional s t a f f s , f i e l d o f f i c e s in several 
countries, and worldwide budgets which compare in s i ze with those o f the 
smaller governments in A f r i ca . For the purposes o f th is analysis , 
community-based and national NGOs w i l l sometimes be re ferred to together as 
"indigenous" NGOs in order to j o i n t l y dist inguish them from the i r 
"international" counterparts. 
Al l types o f NGOs have grown in numbers and scope as a result o f 
a recent in f lux o f fore ign aid into the voluntary sector . The outpouring o f 
public support f o r pr ivate charitable appeals l i k e Band Aid/Live Aid f o r 
Africa and USA f o r A f r i ca is only the most celebrated, indicator o f a s h i f t in 
the way that aid resources are accumulated and del ivered in the 1980s. Even 
as overal l aid l eve l s have declined in recent years, the amount o f o f f i c i a l 
b i lateral assistance channelled through international NGOs has more than 
tr ipled, from $332rn in 1973 to 1.18 b i l l i o n in 1983 (Smith 1987). The 
European Economic Community currently contributes over $600 mi l l ion annually 
via this route and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) 
directs a f u l l 12 percent o f i t s aid throurh NGO intermediaries (Brodhead, 
1987). Even mul t i la tera l agencies l i k e the .United Nations Development Program 
(UNDP) and the World Bank are belatedly seeking NGO partners f o r the 
implementation of development projects and are encouraging government-NGO 
joint ventures. A t o t a l o f $1 b i l l i o n is thought to have rcached A f r i ca 
through combined NGO channels in 1986 (Enabling Environment, 1986). 
Having been "discovered" by the international development community, 
NGOs are becoming increasingly confident in asserting an a l ternat ive 
development strategy. David Korten argues '. that the most advanced NGOs have 
passed through the early stages o f organizational evolution and have now 
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entered a y i i rd generation (1986 , p .6-7 ) . NGO development strategy has moved 
beyond the provision o f eirergency ~Te l i e f and social welfare^sebvices and 
beyond even the establishment o f economically self-supporting development 
projects. Organizations are now attempting to "scale up"s to professionalise 
s t a f f , and to act as a catalyst among publ ic, private and NGO agencies in 
creating a supportive environment f o r national development. NGOs are even 
beginning to ?ain a voice at the international level through global consortia 
and networks l i ke the International Council o f Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the 
International Council of Social Welfare (ICSW), and Development Innovations 
and Networks ( I RED) , sail based in Europe. Important African contributions to 
the debate on internat ional development po l icy include the "Declaration of 
NGOs on the African Economic and Social Cr is is " at the special session of the 
United Nations in May 1986 , and the formation o f the continent-wide Eorum of 
African Voluntary Development Organizations (FAVDO) in May 1987. 
Whether NGOs can f u l f i l l the expectations now placed on their 
shoulders remains to be seen. The claim that NGOs are more "e f fect ive" — 
that i s , able to attain stated goals — than other forms of development 
organization . i s , of course, an empirical question. The evidence to date 
suggests that organized voluntary action can improve popular access to water 
and sanitation f a c i l i t i e s , primary health serv ices, and credit and management 
support to small-scale business enterprises (USAID 1C86, Smith 1987). 
Moreover, awareness tra ining among c l i ents and participatory decision-making 
seem to contribute to the susta inabi l i ty o f th is type of development activity. 
Hyden has made perhaps the most ar t iculate and spirited case for NGOs in 
Afr ica in terms o f the i r closeness to the grassroots, motivated f ie ld sta f f , 
and low-cost management s t y l e (1983, 119-123). Chambers adds that a key NGO 
advantage over government is the ab i l i t y to act quickly (1987, p . l ) . 
On the other hand, NGOs also su f f e r from a set of basic organizational 
weaknesses that inhibi t the impact o f the i r w?rk. NGO projects are often 
iso lated from one another and from Planned government interventions, and 
are d i f f i c u l t to rep l i ca te in diss imi lar environmental conditions. 
Moreover^ "small" i s usually expensive, and while NGO micro-projects may be 
r e l a t i v e l y e f f e c t i v e , they are also usually i ne f f i c i en t . There is a 
persistent shortage o f sk i l l ed managers in the voluntary sector and a 1;. 
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clarity about the management pr inciples that underpin part ic ipatory modes o f 
development. Finally, because research and eve luet ic n are not always 
conducted, very l i t t l e in the way ^f systematic learnin" i s being gleaned from 
the NGO experience (CEC 1983; Smith 1987). In a t o l l i n g cr i t ique o f in f l a t ed 
claims for effectiveness, Judith Tendler has assembled evidence from Latin 
America that NGOs do net always de l i ve r sustainable benef i ts or reach the very 
poorest (ch. Tendler, 1982; DAI, 1979). And Mutisc has questioned whether 
NGOs in Africa actually involve peonle in choices of technology, or merely 
serve as a conduit for pre-processed plans (1985, p .65) . 
Indeed, in Africa, NGOs face the danger o f being oversold. The 
positive reputation of NGOs in th is context has arisen by default — as a 
response to the shortcomings of Stat^ intervention — rather than from a 
systematic review of concrete accomplishments. Enthusiasm for NGO approaches 
must be tempered by the recognition that the organized voluntary sector in 
Africa is s t i l l extremely weak and dependent, even compared with other tThird 
World countries. As Hyden reminds us, there are few indigenous organizations 
of any strength, most NGOs being loca l branches or a f f i l i a t e s o f international 
organizations which rely heavily on outside funding (1983 , 119). NGOs w i l l 
find great d i f f icul ty in winning recognition from rov^rnment as credible 
development actors for as lone as they lack a sol id domestic f inanc ia l base. 
Indeed. NGOs relate to African governments in a context o f assymmetrical power. 
The Issue: Who Leads Dov.loomerit? 
The growth of NGO's peses a dilemma fo r the State. Should the 
public authorities encourage or discourage pr ivate ins t i tu t iona l i n i t i a t i v e s 
in rural development? 
On the one hand, organized voluntary, a c t i v i t y promises to contribute 
to the improvement of l i v ing standards, a developmental goal to which 
governments are themselves committed. At bes t , the de l i ve ry o f NGO serv ices 
to rural areas can reduce the weighty managerial and f i s c a l burden o.f 
providing service coverage on a nationwide basis . In most Afr ican countries, 
rural extension services operate onlv in termi t tent ly , i f at a l l . Faced with 
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inadequate budgetary resources, extension agencies lack the material means to 
execute the i r programs and to pay personnel on time. As a result they 
encounter declining morale, s t a f f de fect ions, and a lack of organizational 
e f f ec t i veness . Under these circumstances i t would appear to be in the public 
interest to encourage NGOs to serve the State in an auxiliiary ' service role. 
Indeed, an incumbent p o l i t i c a l regime might stand to gain i f NGOs can mobilize 
resources and de l i ver benef i ts to regions and classes that are otherwise 
unreachable. 
On the other hand, e f f e c t i v e NGO i n i t i a t i v e s may reflect unfavourably 
on the government's performance at inducing rural development. During the 
nat ional ist struggle and from the outset o f independence, political leaders 
held out the prospect o f new opportunities and improved l i f e chances for their 
fo l lowers . The very legit imacy o f African governments has come to be 
predicated on the capacity to make good on promises of economic and social 
advancement. Governments are therefore loathe to admit that they have 
performed poorly because of the implication th is holds for their right to hold 
power. They may be unwillinp, to allow credit f o r socioeconomic progress to 
accrue to any or~anization other than the State i t s e l f , tether than regarding 
NQOs as a l l i e s in the development enterprise, leaders can come to distrust 
them as potent ia l challengers in the realm of po l i t ica l leadership. At worst, 
NGOs which organize c l i en ts at the loca l l e v e l may sow seeds of political 
discontent from which opposition can be mounted against an incumbent regime. 
The issue o f government-NGO re lat ions therefore raises fundamental 
questions about the balance between c i v i l soc iety and the State in Africa. In 
the West, voluntary associations played a formative role, not only in the 
accumulation o f economic wealth, but as a crucible for forging an attachment 
to basic democratic values among the nooulace at large. Informed and active 
c i t i zens organized into autonomous associations and representative bodies were 
sometimes able to provide a counterweight to the accumulation of excessive 
power by the State. In A f r i ca , however, the sequence of institution-buil ling 
has departed from this checked and balanced model. Political independence saw 
the intact transfer o f an already large and strong ("overdeveloped') State 
from colonial to nat iona l is t hands. P o l i t i c a l leaders generally chose to use 
State power to attempt to weld together the ethnically-varied peonies wr 
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their boundaries into seme semblance o f nationhood. Ihe general trend has 
therefore been towards pol i t ica l and administrative centra l i zat ion with 
independent organizations swe^t under the wing o f the one-party State o r 
abolished completely under mi l i tary rule. Because popular democracy is not on 
the immediate agenda, the "p lura l i z inr " contribution of NGOs is not 
necessarily valued cr welcomed Vv the powers-that-he. 
The relationship between governments and NGOs i s further complicated 
by the fact that both operate in an international arena. In A f r i ca , fore ign 
assistance comprises a larger proportion o f public revenues than in any other 
part of the world. Governments tend to welcome NGO i n i t i a t i v e s that attract 
foreign resources as long as they are addit ional to ex ist ing f lows o f 
concessionary development capita l . Put p o l i t i c a l leaders can react negat ively 
i f donors hecin to reallocate development assistance away from governments and 
in favour of NGOs. I t is clear that internat ional donors are increasingly 
enamoured of NGOs and often tout them as ? f l e x i b l e a l ternat ive to the 
bureaucratic rigidity of the State. The fac t th- t this can have the e f f e c t o f 
reducing o f f i c i a l aid revenues does not endear NGOs to the author i t ies . In 
real ity, the holdings of the national treasury may be unaffected i f NGOs can 
relieve government of some o f the burdens o f serv ice de l i v e ry . And i f the 
claim is true that NGOs can do certa in rural development jobs with greater 
efficiency than governments, then there may even be a net f i s c a l b ene f i t . 
But governments are l i ke l y to interpret sh i f t s in funding patterns 
by foreign donors in pol i t ica l rather than economic terms. The control o f 
resources, and the use of such control in building p o l i t i c a l support and 
staying in power, is more important to p o l i t i c a l leaders than the n ice t i es o f 
economic, cost-benefit analysis. Toreign aid i s such a lucrat ive source o f 
largesse that the State is unlikely to allow i t to s l i ; easi ly from i t s grasp. 
Moreover, African governments also ins is t on the soverign r ight to act as 
gatekeepers between organizations within th e i r borders and agencies from the 
outside world. They are part icular ly sens i t ive to any implication that donors 
might seek to influence the choice o f p r i o r i t i e s in rural development or any 
other policy sphere. When issues of national sovereignty are at stake, 
governments are likely to scrut in ize the internat ional connections o f NGOs 
with particular care. 
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PART ONE 
A FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYSING GOVERNMENT NGO-RELAT10NS 
Governments and NGOs are separate species of organization. Crudely 
stated, the organizational imperative o f the State i s administrative command 
and contro l , whereas NGOs seek to inculcate autonomous and participatory 
action. Because a l l inst i tut ions are comple^ structures, and the actors 
within them are driven by mixed motives, such a characterization may be 
overdrawn. But, in order to bet ter understand the dynamics of government-NGO 
re la t i ons , i t i s worth extracting f o r analyt ical purposes the distinctive 
ob ject ives and methods, structures and cultures o f each type of organization. 
The basic function o f government, in aAfr ica or elsewhere, is to 
impose and maintain order. Because A f r i ca contains the newest of nations, the 
problem of forg ing uni f i ed control over a national t e r r i t o r y is perhaps more 
pressing and in t rac t i b l e than in any other world region. Even i f a government 
professes a developmentalist ideology — as a l l African governments do — 
the i r f i r s t respons ib i l i ty i s to maintain the in t eg r i t y and security and 
national rei lm. In situations where the values of governability and 
development run counter to one another, the public authorities are bound to 
opt f o r the former. 
In the quest f o r p o l i t i c a l order , most Afr ican governments have 
endeavofr^j to eliminate independent centers o f power. The universal trend to 
centra l i zation represents an attemot by p o l i t i c a l leaders to enclose an unruly 
p o l i t i c a l environment within the confines of a uni f ied set of manageable 
p o l i t i c a l ins t i tu t i ons . Where they e x i s t , organizations l i k e labour unions, 
agr icultural cooperatives and professional associations have usually been 
coopted and contained within a corporatist form o f p o l i t i c a l monopoly. The 
State has o f t en attempted to preempt the formation o f independent associations 
by sett ing up a l ternat ives o f i t s own: f o r example, the cooperative movement 
in most parts o f A fr ica i s sponsored from above, usually by a Ministry of 
Cooperatives; l o ca l development committees are mandated f o r every rural 
administrative un i t , usually according to a blueprint drawn up, not by the 
Ministry o f Planning, but — i l lus t ra t ing the excesses o f overcentralizatior. 
— by the O f f i c e o f the President. 
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Because they district independent i n i t i a t v Afr ican governments 
have too often fallen back on regulat ion as a mechanism f o r propel l ing change 
in the countryside. Following co lonia l precedents, Afr ican governments have 
used legal authourity to mandate changes in such basic ins t i tu t i ons as rural 
land use patterns and agricultural markets. The State j u s t i f i e s these changes 
in terms of benefit for rural residents but, on c loser examination, reform 
often "I turns out to be structured f o r the convenience o f the author i t i es : 
vi l lage consolidation schemes, f o r example, have usually been designed to ease 
central planning and service - .. d e l i v e r y ; agr icul tura l 'prices and l e v i e s have 
been set to swell the coffers o f the national t reasury. Far from cap i t a l i z ing 
on rural folks' genuine desire t o develop themselves, the Afr ican State has 
usually relied on standardized regulat ions that have discouraged voluntary 
in i t iat ive and led to popular dis i l lusionment. 
Notwithstanding ideological commitments to popular mobi l i zat ion, 
o f f i c i a l policy has usually contributed to a shrinking o f the c i v i c arena and 
a tightening of pol i t ical control . Electoral reforms in postcolonia l .Afr ica 
have been consistently aimed at reducing popular par t i c ipa t ion and 
guaranteeing continuity for incumbents. Administrative reforms to 
decentralize development planning h ive usually served only to strengthen the 
technical authority of government f i e l d o f f icers^ over the l o ca l resource 
allocation process. Indeed, the pr incipal task o f central ly-appointed 
o f f i c i a l s is to contain and manage l o ca l demands. Because Afr ican governments 
favour a controlled and predictable p o l i t i c a l environment, they end up 
legitimizing and protecting the status quo. With few exceptions, the trend in 
national governance in Africa over the l a s t t h i r t y years has been 
conservative. In the e f f o r t to demonstrate author i ty , A fr ican governments 
have too often fallen into the t rap o f authoritarianism. 
By contrast, developmental NGOs display a set o f charac te r i s t i c s 
that run counter to this Sta t i s t model. 
Governments and NGOs d i f f e r par t ly by d e f i n i t i o n , since voluntary 
agencies identify themselves as : 'non-governmental" as a way o f d is t inguishing 
their approach from that of the public sec tor . While some wr i ters ob j ec t to 
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the designation "non-government" as a negative and contentless label (Fowler 
1985), I f ind i t a valuable descriptor f o r the purposes of this paper. In an 
important sense NGOs can be defined in terus - ° ^ their commitment to 
organizational autonomy. They see themselves as wowing allegiance to no vested 
interest but, instead, claim a d irect re lat ionship with social groups and 
movements. Even i f they cannot de l i v e r , NGOs promise an alternative to 
entrenched and bureaucratic methods o f doing development. And, in a sector 
where organizations are weak and fragmented, complete autonomy is never". 
feas ib le or desireable. Yet voluntary organizations s t i l l find i t useful to 
def ine the i r ident i ty in terms o f independence from the dominant institutional 
presence and practises o f the State. 
A l l NGOs — whether community-based, national or international — 
share to some degree the organizational pr inc ip le of voluntarism. Voluntary 
e f f o r t can take the form o f c o l l e c t i v e labour on community projects in the 
poor countries or public fund-raising appeals in the industrialized world. 
The concept o f voluntarism cuts across the common distinction between 
"membership organizat ions" that help themselves and "service organizations" 
that help others (Leonard, 19 82). Whatever i t s form and scale, voluntarism 
sets NGOs apart. Public and pr ivate agencies are organized according to 
d i f f e r e n t pr inc ip les : the exerc ise o f authority and the pursuit of prof i t 
r espec t i ve ly . Together with other non-prof i t service agencies ~ like 
un i ve rs i t i e s , churches, and unions — the NGO community might even be said to 
const i tute a " th ird sector" (Esman and Uphoff, 1984-). In practice, of course, 
NGOs are not sustained by voluntarism alone; in order to survive, they may 
come to depend on donor resources rather than spontaneous self-help e f for t ; 
and in order to grow, they o f t en have to engage in income-generating 
a c t i v i t i e s or build professional bureaucracies. But NGO leaders tend to set 
basic organizational ob ject ives and recruit and motivate staff on the basis of 
a shared core b e l i e f in the value o f unrewarded public service. 
The NGO approach i s also mobi l i zat ional : i t seeks to stimulate and 
release popular energies in support o f community goals. While practice does 
rot always l i v e up to ideo logy , NGOs are generally more l ikely than 
governments to work with the noor and disadvantaged elements in society. 
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Since some NGO programs begin with disaster r e l i c t , t h e i r c l i en te l e is often 
composed of refugees or displaced persons with no permanent home or visible 
means of support. Alternatively, NGO c l i en ts may s p e c i f i c a l l y target their 
program on "d i f f i cu l t " areas o f the countryside f a r from administrative 
headquarters or in inhospitable aero-ecological zones; or they seek out women 
or members of minority ethnic groups. While NGOs were once gui l ty of 
paternalism and welfarism, almost a l l now see community organization and 
popular participation as essential ingredients o f sustainable development. 
The most progressive NGOs rely on radical analyses o f the po l i t i ca l economy of 
poverty and techniques of awareness-raising and conscientizat ion. "Third 
generation" NGOs are particularly l i k e l y to hold p o l i t i c a l empowerment and 
policy voice as central tenets. They no longer regard themselves as direct 
providers of material assistance but as development educators and capacity 
builders whose task is to enable the poor to demand socia l justice for 
themselves. 
NGO concerns for poverty a l l e v i a t i on , p o l i t i c a l l ibera t ion .and 
social justice reflect . the general ly forward-looking orientation of NGO 
leadership and staf f . Experimentation in programming tends to challenge the 
standard operatinp procedures o f government agencies. The NGO approach 
therefore tends to attract personnel from a background in the religious l e f t 
and the Gandhian pacifism. Only gradually i s the gospel o f liberation 
theology penetrating the mainstream Christ ianity in A f r i ca , through progressive 
individuals in the Catholic church and through the soc ia l responsibility 
programs of national a f f i l i a t e s o f the World Council o f Churches. NGOs help 
to provide a home for new ideas and to l e g i t im i ze them so that they are not 
immediately branded as subversive. And, as inst i tut ions emerge that o f f e r 
wo*k for social transformation as a professional option, adherents of minority 
viewpoints can find opportunities f o r employment and expression that would 
otherwise be closed by the State. 
Factors affecting Government-NGO Relations 
Precisely because governments and NGOs are organized di f ferent ly and 
use contrasting approaches to rural development, they are l i k e l y , at times, to 
come into confl ict . Massoni has argued tha t , in pract ice , "most governments 
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cooperate with most NGOs" (1985). This observation holds true for Africa 
where the two part ies have general ly been able to work out a mutually 
acceptable modus v ivendi . While governments and NGOs in Africa may not 
succeed in ent i re ly eradicating inst i tut ional competition and mutual 
suspicion, they are usually able to avoid open conflicts that debilitate the 
national rural development e f f o r t . 
In a continent as diverse and rapidly changing as Africa, 
government-NGO re lat ions naturally vary from place to place and from time to 
time. The amount o f operational space available to the voluntary sector 
depends on the interact ion o f part icular governments with' specific NGOs. 
Since the generic character ist ics o f the two types of organization sketched 
above cannot capture a l l the nuances o f individual cases, i t is necessary to 
look more c lose ly at certain ideographic aspects of institutional performance. 
As before , l e t us look f i r s t at the government side. 
Much depends on the nature o f the governance system. States with 
c i v i l i a n constitutions that provide f o r freedom of association are more l ikely 
to t o l e r a t e NGO a c t i v i t y than mi l i tary or martial law regines. Multiparty 
systems, few as they are in A f r i ca , are l i k e l y to be more hospitable to NGOs 
than governments which are s t i l l in the process of consolidating power in a 
s ingle-party s t~te . And t o the extent that informal polit ical influence 
determines tho actual d is tr ibut ion o f po l i t i c a l and economic rewards, 
po l i t i c ians are l i k e l y to welcome NGOs as an additional source of spoils for 
d is t r ibut ion. NGOs are there fore l i k e l y to find encouragement in countries 
where p o l i t i c a l part ies are weak and po l i t i c s is conducted along personalistic 
and patronage l i n e s . 
To a l esser extent, the prevai l ing pol icy regime also influences the 
space avai lahle f o r voluntary organizat ion. One would expect that governments 
which adopt a l i b e ra l economic pol icy — f o r example an International Monetary 
Fund structural adjustment package - - are more likely to encourage independent 
NGO entrepreneurship. Indeed, fore ign funders play a crucial role in creating 
a favourable cl imate f o r NGO a c t i v i t y , both through the general leverage oi 
"po l i cy dialogue" and through decisions to support individual NGOs. Contrar 
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to expectations. African regimes with a l e f t - o f - c e n t e r commitment to "peoples ' 
power" are not necessarily l i k e l y to welcome like-minded NGOs within t h e i r 
borders. The leaders of such regimes usually claim to have a genuine 
understanding of popular aspirations and see no need f o r NGO aux i l i a r i es to 
perform the mass mobilization r o l e o f the vanguard party. 
Finally, the administrative capacity o f the State determines the 
extent to which NGOs are free to operate unhindered. While o o l i t i c a l leaders 
may intend to regulate the NGO sector they may f ind i t d i f f i c u l t to do so. 
Because NGO activit ies are small in scale and geographically scattered, 
governments may find it costly to keep track of everything that is going on. 
As will be evident from the i l l u s t r a t i v e examples presented below, 
government-NGO relations in Afr ican countries go through periodic " c r i s e s " in 
which government o f f i c ia ls take o f f ence at some aspect of NGO a c t i v i t y , 
resolve publicly to crack down, but then f ind i t d i f f i c u l t to enforce 
corrective measures. 
There are also variations on the NGO side which influence the 
equation of government-NGO re la t ions . 
The f i rs t factor is the extent o f NGO a c t i v i t y . Where the NGO sector 
is small, government can easi ly choose to overlook i t as unimportant; as i t 
grows, however, is i t l ike ly to inquire into NGO ac t i v i t y within the i r 
jurisdiction i f they sense that the NGO sector i s growing uncontrollably and 
without ful l o f f i c i a l knowledge. . .-Growth o f the NGO sector is l i k e l y to be 
swiftest in countries which serve as nodes f o r surrounding countries and where 
international NGOs establish regional f i e l d o f f i c e s to serve a wider Afr ican 
sub-region. 
The degree of government control i s c r i t i c a l l y determined by the 
geographical location of NGO operations within a host country. Because 
African nations are ethical ly d iverse , and because minority groups may l i v e 
in border areas abutting hos t i l e neighbouring States, governments o f ten have 
very good reason to fear fragmentation o f the p o l i t y . Opposition to central 
government in Africa is usually based on sub-national ident i t y leading to 
political conflict in the form of irredentism, des tab i l i za t ion or guer r i l l a 
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warfare. Because NGOs work with neglected or marginal groups — including 
those who l i v e in disputed t e r r i t o r i e s — they run the risk of becoming 
embroiled in national p o l i t i c a l disputes. And those NGOs which work with 
refugees or engage in cross-border r e l i e f operations can touch upon sensitive 
issues o f the international re lat ions among African states. Similarly, NGOs 
can expect a hos t i l e reception from governments i f they choose to locate 
a c t i v i t i e s in regions where resistance movements are engaged in armed 
c o n f l i c t . Indeed, NGOs general ly f ind more latitude to operate near a capital 
c i t y or in a national heartland than from a remote rural base. 
Of equal importance, governments take account of the content of NGO 
programs. Most rural development a c t i v i t i e s are non-controversial: most 
people concur that chi ld immunization, clean water, agricultural production 
and road-building are desireable innovations in rural Africa. Governments and 
NGOs may d i f f e r ever the methods o f serv ice delivery and choice of 
benef ic iar ies but such disagreements rare ly lead to a polit ical impasse. 
There is another set o f development a c t i v i t i e s , however, which can set 
governments and NGOs on a c o l l i s i on course. Certain progressive NGOs argue 
that equitable economic development cannot take place unless governments put 
in place a foundation o f p o l i t i c a l and l ega l preconditions. Of primary 
importance i s the observance o f universal human rights, in terms particularly 
of c i v i l and p o l i t i c a l l i b e r t i e s . In practivc-, NGOs that specialize, in human 
r ights advocacy have been slow to gain access and take root in Africa. The 
explanation rests with s ens i t i v i t y o f African governments to the barest hint 
o f negative international publ ic i ty about the management of domestic dissent. 
This point brings us back to the confounding impact of the wider 
environment in which governments and NGOs find themselves. 
Take, f o r example, the e f f e c t s o f funding source. All types of NGOs 
--. internat ional , national and community-based — are heavily dependent on 
grants from fore ign donors. One estimate suggests that intermediate NGOs in 
Kenya rece ive 90 percent o f the i r annual operating expenses from abroad 
(Mwangi, 1986). Governments respond to th is unhealthy situation in ambiguous 
ways. On the one hand, the authorit ies welcome additional resources for th, 
development e f f o r t ; on the other hand they are concerned that NGOs are 
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accountable to , and may act as proxies f o r , f o re ign in te res ts . I ronical ly , 
the government position may be equally equivocal in r e l a t i on to 
locally-eenerated funds. On paper, most A f r ican governments are committed to 
the principle of self-rel iance through loca l resource mobi l i zat ion. In 
practice, governments become concerned about loca l fund-rais ing e f for ts i f 
contributors represent a par t i cu lar i s t i c community. Sub-national development 
associations have lately bePun to emerge in A f r i ca as a means o f building 
support for development in a r iven ethnic or reg ional l o c a l i t y . Headed by 
prominent pol i t ical leaders, these associat ions ra ise money from town dwellers 
to support health and education pro jec ts back home. Perhaps mindful that 
recrionally-based "welfare s o c i e t i e s " were e f f e c t i v e at p o l i t i c a l mobilization 
against colonial regimes, A f r i c a ' s contemporary leaders tend to discourage 
such activity. 
In sum, the very existence o f NQOs is a t e s t o f a government's 
stance on a basic issue of national governance: how t o balance organizational <5-
autcnomy and pol i t ical control. Because NGO a c t i v i t i e s can involve a wide 
range of sensitive pol i t ical actors — donors in the internat ional arena, 
neighbouring countries in the reg ion, and soc ia l groups within i ts own 
territory — a government may even come to see the existence o f NGOs in 
national security terms. The more f r a g i l e a government's sense of pol i t ical 
legitimacy, the less permissive i t i s l i k e l y to be towards the 
institutionalization of a strong voluntary sector . Where governments are not 
confident of their grip on power they are l i k e l y to f ear a populace mobilized 
in autonomuos organizations and to favour regulat ion and contro l . As argued 
earl ier, the amount of space allowed to NGOs in any givpp country is therefore 
determined f i r s t and foremost by p o l i t i c a l considerat ions, rather than by any 
calculation of the contribution o f NGOs to economic and soc ia l development. 
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PART TWO 
STRATEGIES OF AUTONOMY AND CONTROL 
In pract ice , bow do governments enforce control and NGOs assert 
autonomy in sub-Saharan Afr ica? Can we discern any regular patterns of 
organizational behavior? Are governments or NGOs relatively more ef fect ive 
at structuring ' their mutual re lat ionship along preferred lines? Can autonom/ 
and control be reconciled in constructive patterns of collaboration in rural 
development? 
Strategies o f Government Control 
Governments can invoke an array o f regulatory instruments — laws, 
administrative ru les , p o l i t i c a l pressures — to ensure that NGOs comply with 
national norms and standards. This discussion below outlines four regulatory 
mechanisms that African governments commonly use and which are arrayed below 
on an ascending scale o f government control . It should be noted that 
governments general ly t r y gentle forms o f regulation before resorting to 
heavy-handed intervention. Suob o f f i c i a l restraint may reflect a philosophy 
o f regulation that " l ess i s best " , or a pragmatic admission that tight and 
systematic control o f NGOs is beyond the ailing capacity of a "retreating" 
African State. 
Monitoring 
Governments are able to r e s t r i c t the size of the NGO sector by 
monitoring the reg is t ra t ion o f organizations. In order to transact business, 
NGOs require a l ega l i d en t i t y , f o r which they must a^ply for registration 
under a l ega l s t i tu t e . Government o f f i c i a l s usually have a degree of 
d iscret ion in deciding whether or not allow an NGO to be established within 
the jur i sd ic t ion o f the State. Afr ican governments have sometimes declined or 
delayed permission f o r international NGO agencies to open f ie ld o f f ices i f 
re lat ions with the NGO's home government are strained. Some goverments, for 
example in Somalia, view any kind o f voluntary association as a potential 
po l i t i c a l threat and there fore discourage NGO formation and registration. 
Governments can use the moment o f registration, as well as regular 
reporting requirements, to gather information or voluntary agencies. 
Ethiopia, f o r example, the Re l i e f and Rehabilitation Commission maintain: 
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detailed records or the agencies that ire ^resent in the country, the i r 
location, and their accom-lishrrer.ts. In r e a l i t y , however, most African 
governments lack reliable data. They have demonstrated a l imited capacity to 
undertake even rudimentary monitoring, such as counting the numbers o f NGOs 
and the amounts of foreign funding they brine in, even though' .such information 
is fundamental to national development planning. Most governments simply 
require annual after-the-fact reports on projects supported by NGOs. Foreign 
donors or NGOs themselves have usually taken the lead in producing d i rec tor ies 
of NGOs numbers and services. And, in Kenya in 1985, the Ministry of Finance 
actually applied to a foreign donor f o r support to establish a basic inventory 
of the NGOs within i ts borders! 
The problem of weak nomitoring can be part ly traced to divided l i n t s 
of leeal and administrative respons ib i l i t y within the public serv ice . 
Governments have no standardized format by which indigenous NGOs make the i r 
presence known: welfare organizations r eg i s t e r with the Ministry o f Social 
Services; Cooperatives with the Minstry of Cooperatives; non-prof i t 
companies with the Ministry o f Commerce-!' and certain r e l i g i ous NGOs arc-
entirely exempt from registrat ion since they f e l l under the aegis o f a church. 
Moreover, international NGOs, rather than reg is ter ing under lega l s tatute , 
operate under memoranda of agreement with relev^^t sectoral Ministries and the 
Ministry of Foreign Af fa irs . And, where the Ministry of Finance takes an 
interest in foreign NGOs f o r nurpose-s of exchange control and taxation 
regulations, a whole range of other governments units are responsible f o r 
partial aspects of NGO ac t i v i t y ranging from customs clearance f o r imported 
goods to security clearance f o r technical assistance personnel. In short, NGO 
contacts with government are- scattered over a wide ins t i tu t iona l f r on t . Few 
African governments have- set up a central c learing house through which to 
conduct exhaustive and re l i ab le monitoring. 
Sheffield has therefore suggested that governments should establ ish 
simple and transparent procedures fo r NGO reg is t ra t ion and reporting (1987, 
24). I t is certainly d i f f i c u l t to se^ e how the author i t ies can hold NGOs 
publicly accountable in the absence o f such basic measures. NGO managers 
commonly complain about the unnecessary complexities o f dealing with many arms 
of government but, in pract ice , they oppose the- cent ra l i za t ion o f monitoring 
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capacity. The prevai l ing situation — in which t ' e r e is blurred 
respons ib i l i ty and poor communication among government agencies — suits NGOs 
since i t leaves them with room for maneuver. While government capacity to 
monitor NGO a c t i v i t i e s would almost cer ta in ly be- enhanced by single point of 
contact, the establishment o f a powerful central agency has usually fallen 
victim to jur i sd ic t iona l struggles within the public bureaucracy. Since many 
agencies have a claim to monitor some aspect o f NGO act iv i ty , i t has usually 
proved impossible f o r the contenders to agree on who should take the lead. 
In Zimbabwe in 1987, f o r example, there were at least three 
gove-mment ministr ies vyins over the r ight to screen the establishment and 
programs o f indigenous intermediate and community-based NGOs. The Ministry of 
Labour, Culture and Social Services held t rad i t iona l responsibility for 
administering, the Societ ies Act under which most NGO's are registered in 
Zimbabwe. Yet two new Minis tr ies , created since independence in 1980, claimed 
Authority to monitor rural development NGOs: The Ministry of Community 
Development and Women's A f f a i r s which oversees grassroots development 
i n i t i a t i v e s , and the Ministry of Cooperative: Development which is charged to 
promote cooperative- forms of development organizat ion. Senior o f f i c ia l s in 
both Ministr ies claimed that the i r o f f i c e alone could approve NGO programs in 
rural development and that the othe>r o f f i c e was over-reaching i ts legitimate 
r espons ib i l i t i e s . A s imilar situation prevailed in Kenya where the 
compilation o f basic data on NGOs is the subject of ' ' turf" struggles between 
the Ministry o f Finance and the Ministry o f Culture and Social Services. The 
issue required th. formation of an interminister ia l committee which, through 
the O f f i c e of the President .in June 1987, suspended a l l NGO registration until 
standardized procedures could be worked out. 
Coordination 
Despite th i s sort o f organizational incoherence within the Public 
service o f f i c i a l s o f ten state that "coordination" is the o a l of State 
intervention in th«. NGO sector . Because a government's development 
r espons ib i l i t i e s arc national in sco^e, planners usually try to spread 
investments evenly across the country. By contrast, most NGO projects are 
small-scale, l o ca t i on - spec i f i c , and have marrinal spread effects beyond a 
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favoured project s i te . African .gov :rnments correc t ly see the voluntary sector 
as diverse and fragmented and of ten charge that NGOs contribute to haphazard 
patterns of rural development. The Minister o f Local Government in Zimbabwe, 
for example, described N.'-Os as "uneuided miss i les" whose a c t i v i t i e s do not 
necessarily contribute to the ob jec t i ves o f national development plan. 
I f NGOs are permitted to start development a c t i v i t i e s by whim 01 fancy, there 
is a danger that scarce development resources w i l l be wasted. Rational 
planning through a formal framework, coordinated from a central vantage po int , 
holds out the premise of even service coverage and the avoidance o f 
duplication. 
But coordination cj-':3 both ways. While there is obvious benef i t in 
government laying down policy ruidei ines f o r NGOs, government can also be 
excessively rigid and ponderous in i t s requirements. Experience suggests that 
the quest for coordination o-^ten ends in over-central ized decision-making, 
bureaucratic delay, and the suf focat ion o f badly-needed private i n i t i a t i v e . 
The most ef fect ive exchange and coordination o f ten occurs below the. national 
level between community-based organizations and f r on t - l i n e o f f i c i a l s . Indeed, 
for small voluntary agenoief wo^Wnr at the grassroots., the government is 
personified by a local extension worker or a d i s t r i c t administrative o f f i c i a l . 
Governments in Africa have general ly beer, committed., at l east in 
principle, to administrative decentral izat ion in order to ensure that loca l 
priorities are included in national development plans. Such reforms designate 
lower level administrative e n t i t i e s , such as provincial or d i s t r i c t 
development committees, as the appropriate forum fo r coordinated planning. In 
Kenya, the. District Focus strategy inaugurated in July 1983 empowers D is t r i c t 
Development Committees to review — and accept or r e j e c t — a l l NGO pro jec t 
proposals. In Zimbabwe, in accordance with the Prime Minis ter ' s d i r e c t i v e on 
administrative decentralization in February 1984, NGOs are required to seek 
clearance from the District Administrator before entering any d i s t r i c t with a 
development project. In both instances, the government has asserted a 
prerogative to decide who and what to fund. 
Government ef forts to coordinate MGC programs into o f f i c i a l planning 
processes have therefore tended to focus at the d i s t r i c t l e v e l . This i s 
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ent i re l y appropriate since most NCO programs are f ie ld-based and often cover 
no more than a single d i s t r i c t . For1 the most part , c i v i l servants remain 
scept ical o f the contribution of NCOs to rural development seeing l i t t l e role 
fo r them beyond the provision o f external funding. There may even be 
inst i tut iona l jealousy and competition between impoverished public extension 
agencies and r e l a t i v e l y well-funded NGOs. Local po l i t i c i ans , l ike Members of 
Parliament and Dis t r i c t Councillors who are in f luent ia l on District 
Development Committees, sometimes block NGO pro jec ts or attempt to divert them 
to the i r own homo areas within the d i s t r i c t . Yet l oca l po l i t i c ians have 
generally been quicker than public servants to recognize the potential 
development contribution o f NGOs, and lobby act ibe ly f o r access to the 
resources they control . 
The degree of coordination between government and. NGO plans for 
rural development depends in large part on the extent to which the central 
government is w i l l i ng to eneage in rea l decentral izat ion reforms. African 
leaders have usually lacked the p o l i t i c a l w i l l to meaningfully a l ter the 
balance o f decision-making power between center and l o c a l i t y by involving 
rural foil- in dovr-l oomrnt planning, budgeting and evaluation. In Zimbabwe, 
f o r example, d i s t r i c t planners control no budgets of the i r own and remain 
timid o f makir decisions that may oe countermanded from above. The 
Government of Keny- has implemented a mere thorough decon centrat ion of power, 
but even by 1937 the D is t r i c t Development Committees enjoyed direct control 
over only 6 eor cent of the nat ion 's "mnual f i s c a l resources. A great deal 
depends on individual?. While most Kenyan D is t r i c t Commissioners have taken 
advantage o decentral isat ion reforms to assert the i r own enhanced authority, 
others have made genuine e f f o r t s to consult NCO representatives in drawing up 
d i s t r i c t plans. I f i t occurs at a low l e v e l in the administrative hierarchy, 
then government-led coordiantion e f f o r t s may enhance both loca l participation 
and the e f f i c i e n c y of resource a l locat ion . 
Cooptation 
"Coordination1 implies the sychronization c f a c t i v i t i e s ^mong 
independent organizat ions, whereas "cooptation' i s a f irmer form of control ;'.-
which autonomous organizations are captured and guided by a superordinate 
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agency. Afr ican governments have c loyed the strate r.y o f cooptation through 
the establishment o f quangos (quasi-NGOs) to regulate voluntary sector 
activity. A quango i s a puhlicly-sponsored NGO which is an organizational 
a f f i l i a t ion to a government Ministry. For our purposes, the best examples are 
the National Councils of Social Service that ex ist in Kenya, Uganda and 
Zambia, among other Commonwealth African countries. The d irector and s t a f f o f 
a National Council are appointed bv the Minister responsible f o r soc ia l 
services and the core revenue o f the Council comes from the national Treasury. 
All NGOs with soc ia l wel fare a c t i v i t i e s are required to becom? members, some 
are elected to the governing board, and the Council is intended to become 
their mouthpiece to government. Through the provision o f sub-grants to NGOs, 
Councils seek to guide voluntary sector e f f o r t s that supplement government's 
direct programs in soc ia l we l fare . 
A re lated model o f ins t i tu t iona l cooptation is exemplif ied by the 
Community Development Trust Fund o f Tanzania (CPTF). While registered as a 
non-profit voluntary associat ion, the CDTF is nopetheless governed by a Board 
of Trustees predominantly composed o f senior p o l i t i c a l o f f i c i a l s , including 
the Prime Minister as Chairman rnd Minister o f Firance as Treasurer. I t s 
objective i s to stimulate and support s e l f -he lp development e f f o r t s at the 
community l e v e l . Since the early l.-iBOs the CDTF budget has been funded 
entirely out o f donor contributions, though the government does attach 
technicians to serve ^DTF projects at the grassroots. Indeed, CDTF serves as 
broker between internat ional and indigenous NGOs as an o f f i c i a l conduit f o r 
foreign support to the voluntary sector . On one hand, this intimate 
arrangement with government has sometimes f a c i l i t a t ed the work o f NGOs in 
Tanzania, f o r example by easing access to tax and import duty exemptions. On 
the other hand, because government and party o f f i c i a l s exercise t i ght central 
control over the a l locat ion of voluntary sector resources, NGOs have been 
re lat ive ly slow to a r i se in Tanzania or to enter from abroad , 
Even where the NGO community sets up i t s own umbrella organizat ions, • 
the government can s t i l l inf luence the i r behavior. The Government o f Togo, 
for example, " inv i t ed " Le Conseil des Organizations Non-Gouvernmentales du 
Togo (CONGAT), to help mesh NGO i n i t i a t i v e s with government po l i c y , an o f f e r 
which the NGOs f e l t bound to accept. In Kenya, the governing party gradually 
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exerted concrol over an umbrella organization o f women's groups known as 
Maendeleo ya Wana wake by incorporating i t into the party structure. And in 
Zimbabwe, debates about the need f o r a national representative institution for 
the women's movement were e f f e c t i v e l y preempted by an announcement that the 
ruling ZANU-PF party intended to set up a Women's Council. 
Despite these e f f o r t s at cooptation, African governments can claim 
l i t t l e last ing suecess. National Councils have generally lacked the resources 
to become e f f e c t i v e agents o f government and to win allegiance and legitimacy 
from an NGO c l i en t e l e . Starved o f public funds, Councils have never been able 
to win NCO confidence as a re l i ab le partner in program development. From its 
formation in 19G4, f o r example, the Kenya National Council for Social Services 
found d i f f i c u l t y in making sub-rrants to member NGOs, which led -- net 
unexpectedly — to a lapse in member in teres t . Moreover, the voluntary sector 
in Afr ica has grown and changed so quickly over the past couple of decades 
that government umbrella bodies have been unable to keep pace. Their social 
welfare orientation is perceived as • anachronistic bv the new devoLoyw.w.-t 
oriented NGOs; and where policy debate is beginning, NGOs regard 
o f f i c i a l sponsorshil as an obstacle to the accurate articulation of their 
views. As Strcmlau notes, a dominant ro le by government may even lead to 
divisions and cc n f l i c t s because members have not had the advantage of 
determinin" the purpose and a c t i v i t i e s of the supervising body (1987, 5). 
Dissolution 
The strategy described here as "dissolution'" is a convenient 
shorthand fo r a range ^f government interventions to impede the functions of 
autonomous organizations. Governments can mandate a wide range of measures to 
l imi t an NGOs freedom of action, with the forced closure of the organization 
as the most severe step. 
African governments have not hesitated to res t r i c t specific NGO 
ac t i v i t i e s where these have been judged contrary to the national interest. In 
Zimbabwe in 1983, f o r example, the government required the Organization of 
Rural Associations f o r Progress (DRAF), the only indigenous service NGO in 
rural Matabeloland, to shut down i t s rerional training center. The governmc 
apparently deemed the development education a c t i v i t i e s of this popular 
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organization- to be too s ens i t i v e in the context o f re j ional resistance by 
cthnic minority ' d iss idents " . n^ ' during, the general e l ec t i on campaign in 
1985, the Zimbabwe government banned a l l n o n - o f f i c i a l meetings throughout the 
countrv, e f f e c t i v e l y disrupting the work o f evorv rural-based NGO fo r a 
thrae-roonth period. During the drourhts in Ethiopia, the government's Re l i e f 
an^ Pehabiliatati-p -Commission has repeatedly intervened to prevent the 
delivery of r e l i e f supplies to rebel -held areas in Fritre-a and T i g r e . And the 
governments of Uganda, Kenya and Somalia have at various times outlawed the 
use of radios by NGOs to communicate between capi ta l c i t y headquarters and 
upccuntrv project s i t e s . 
In other cases, governments have intervened to harass indiv idual 
leaders or to reorganize the internal governance o f an NGO. The cooperat ive 
movement in A f r i ca has been regu lar ly subject to o f f i c i a l interventions to 
replace despotic managers or to correct corrupt prac t i ces , o f t en f o r good 
reason. On other occasions, ovcrzealous government o f f i c i a l s have used l e g a l 
power to undermine e f f e c t i v e NGO programs that appear too powerful or 
independent. In 1985 the Saving Development Movement (SDM), a grassroots 
women's movement in rural Zimbabwe, was brought to a s t ands t i l l when the 
Registrar of Cooperatives made accusations of f inanc ia l mismanagement. Even 
though the courts u l t imate ly ruled in SDM's the government was able to 
replace the leaders o f the savi.pgs movement, d isso lve i t s support serv ice 
wing, and attach i t s assets . Because of the dispute, the grassroots 
act iv i t ies o f women's savings groups were disrupted and the future o f a proven 
method for achieving' f inanc ia l s e l f - r e l i a n c e was cal led into Question. Under 
these circumstances, p o l i t i c a l intervent ion by the State c l ea r l y inhibi ted 
rural economic development. 
Governments have v i s i t e d even more drast ic measures, such as 
detention without t r i a l under public security regulat ions , on the leaders o f 
indigenous human r ights NGOs in A f r i ca . In Zaire , f o r example, the government 
has repeatedly stymie^ e f f o r t to es tab l i sh an advocacy body f o r c i t i z e n ' s 
rights by imprisoning a c t i v i s t s . In 1986 the Zimbabwe government b r i e f l y 
detained the Chairman and Director o f the loca l Catholic Commission f o r 
Justice and Peace -or suspicion o f providing information to Amnesty 
international And in lr-<87, President Museveni invoked the Public Order and 
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Security Act to detain the Secretary-General of the Uganda Human Rights 
Act iv i s ts fo l lowing outspoken comments in the international press about 
alleged government a t roc i t i e s . 
On balance, however, i t is perhaps remarkable how rarely African 
governments have resorted to the extreme measure o f actually dissolving NGOs. 
There are vi.ry few cases o f Governments requiring international NGOs to pack 
up and leavo an African country. Perhaps the best publicized such case 
occurred in 1985 (ch ) when the Government o f Ethiopia excel led the f i e ld staff 
of Medicins sans Frontier (MSF), a European medical r e l i e f agency. The 
prec ip i tat ing event was MSF's publication o f a report c r i t i c i z ing the 
government po l icy of population resettlement which claimed, that the motivation 
f o r the program was p o l i t i c a l rather than developmental and which documented 
harsh conditions and o f f i c i a l mismanagement in the resettlement camps. In 
1987, the Government of Sudan, headquartered in the Islamic north of the 
country, threatened to close down sixteen international NGOs with operations 
in the Christian and secessionist south. At the time of writing, the issue 
had not been f i n a l l y resolved, but the number of NGOs involved had been 
reduced to three, two o f which — Lutheran World Re l i e f and World Vision — 
were lobbying hard to s tay , and only one — Association o f Christian Resource 
Organizations Serving Sudan (ACFOSSi — seemed l i v e l y to be banned for 
a l legedly providing assistance to an anti government rruerrilla movement. 
In general, African governments have been more l i a b l e to dissolve 
indigenous than international NGOs, perhars because the repercussions are 
easier to menage in a purely domestic arena,. In Tanzania President Nyerere 
outlawed the Ruvume Development Association (PDA) which had taken, perhaps to 
ser ious ly , his own ' ujamaa" dictum to form peasant associations based on 
cooperation and se l f - r e l i ance . When RDA developed i t s own constitution and 
declined to appcint l oca l ' r o r t y and bureaucratic o f f i c i a l s to i ts management 
committee, the government intervened to dissolve i t . In Kenya, the government 
has requi re ' ethnic wel fare associations with sec t iona l i s t po l i t i ca l ambitions 
to disband. And. in "ambia, the public authorit ies have engaged in a long 
running ba t t l e wit l the loca l branches o f the Jehovah's Witnesses which 
culminate \ In the banning o f the organization in"1968~(ch). Desoitc the 
Witnesses' strong record o f small-scale rural entre^reneurship, the govern-.--
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outraged that the reverent's foJ lovvrs would not pi.edge' a l leg iance to the 
secular authority of the . J ^ t e . 
Dissolutior remains a r a r e l v - u s e s t r a t e g y , perhaps ^cause 
governments are wary of threatening the contribution to development o f the 
voluntary sector a? a whole. When one NGO comes into c on f l i c t with 
government, relations of al l ot v ,er NGOs o f ten become tense. Senior government 
o f f i c ia ls have been known to usr the media or to c a l l national meetings o f NGO 
heads to warr. against meddling in internal p o l i t i c a l or securi ty a f f a i r s . But 
ever, so, NGOs have usually found i t possible, once the storm has blown over , 
to return to business as ; Jual. 
Strategies of NGO Autonomy 
While NGO managers value autonomy as a cardinal organizing pr inciple 
of voluntary action, they also recognize that NGOs do not operate in a vacuum. 
As de Graaf has arpued, NGOs are not ''systems on the i r own" but are integrated 
into a wider political and administrative environment over which they have | 
limited influence md even l ess control (de Graaf 1^87j Smith, 1980). The ' 
post-colonial African State i s the largest and most arser t i ve actor in t ' is 
environment and — even though i t too may have ximited control - - NGOs must 
take account of State actions. Complete organizational autonomy is impossible 
and may not even be des i r ab l e . On occasion, NGO's may wish to enter a 
dialogue with government, e i ther to en l i s t government support in broadening 
and sustaining developmental impact or to inf luence the d irect ion o f public 
policy. The strategies adopted by African NGOs to achieve these ob jec t i ves 
are l isted below in descending order of organizational autonomy. 
Low Prcfi lo 
Seme NGOs see government as :.molaca;,ly incompetent or host i l e to 
popular development e f f o r t s and hav sought to avoid or work around i t . This 
strategy can best be described as keeping a "low p r o f i l e " . Given the vastness 
of the African countryside and the scattered population d is t r ibut ion, 'NGOs 
find i t relatively easy to operate in the in ters t i ces where the state 
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machinery does not reach. The most autonomous forms of NGO organizations are 
usually found at the loca l l e v e l where small community groups can organize on 
a base o f loca l resources. There i s a wealth of spontaneous and collective 
voluntary action in African rural areas which takes the form of food and 
art isanal production, local marketing and community improvement projects. 
Because the community-based organizations that promote such informal activity 
are l e ga l l y unregistered, the i r a c t i v i t i e s are not monitored by adminstrative 
o f f i c i a l s or documented by planners and researchers. 
Even when community-based groups be.^in to reach up into wider 
markets, they are sometimes able to bypass the unpredictable service 
inst i tut ions of the State, /'friean peasant farmers are well aware, for 
example, that i f they re ly on o f f i c i a l agr icul tural marketing agencies, that 
f e r t i l i z e r and seeds may be del ivered l a t e or that there may be delays in 
receiv ing payment f o r crop sales. They there fore tend to look for alternative 
ins t i tut iona l channels that perform more re l iably . One such alternative is 
the network o f Christian mission stations that spar. African rural areas with 
secular outreach programs to support health, education and agriculture. The 
churches o f ten recrui t the i r own development technicians and front-line 
inimntors that operate alongside or instead o f — government extension 
s t a f f . The scope o f church programs is o f t en lo<_ilized or restricted to 
parishioners, but t a!; en to fret her, thev constitute a para l l e l service delivery 
system to that of the State. 
Generally spoakine , indigenous community based NGOs are more likely to 
attempt to operate in i so la t ion From y;vwrnment than are. international NGOs. 
Indeed international NGOs, hieb.lv sens i t i ze to the n ice t i es of diplomatic 
protocol , bend over backwards to comply with government entry , registration 
and operational reouirements. This is not to say that international NGOs have 
never been driven to construct P i ra l l e l . . delivery?systems - - indeed this is 
standard operating procedure f o r >TG0 r e l i e f e f f o r t s in emergency situations — 
but they are usually reluctant to s- e such structures inst i tutional ized. For 
does a low NGO p r o f i l e always con f l i c t with o f f i c i a l development preferences. 
Governments are l ikedv to welcome fTGOs that can conduct e f f e c t i v e development 
programs without ins is t ing on ownership and publ ic i ty . In other words, low 
p r o f i l e NGOs that are w i l l i ng to submerge the i r 'dent i ty and allow the 
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soverrment to take credit f o r development are welcome in o f f i c i a l c i r c l e s . 
Moreover, NGOs with >ro grams i r t i ck l i sh areas such as human rights 
or social justice often f ind i t expedient to adopt a low p r o f i l e f o r purposes 
of protection. On the opt hen , l i k e the Justice and Peace Commission in 
Zimbabwe, this might near cul t ivat ing close behind-the-scenes reporting t i e s 
to senior o f f i c ia l s and scrupulously reserving no ntive publ ic i ty f o r 
instances in which the government docs not respond. On the other hand, l i k e 
the Public Law Institute in Kenya, i t miTht mean concentrating on r e l a t i v e l y 
less controversial areas o f r ights representation, such as consumer and 
environmental affairs. By contrast, the National Council o f Churches in Kenya 
(NCCK) discovered the amaging costs o f a high p r o f i l e stence in 1986. At 
that time the Council voiced public opposition to a Pres ident ia l declaration 
that primary elections f o r Parliament would be conducted by open "queuing" 
rather than by secret ba l l o t . The President condemned the church's assertion 
of freedom of expression -as unwarranted p o l i t i c a l inter ference and shut down 
the previously open lines o f communication between church and -State. , 
Selective Collaboration 
NGCs resist coordination. To a greater or lesser extent a l l NCOs 
regard their own deveJei nent programs as unique and an. reluctant to 
accomodate themselves to th' requirements o f other agencies. Not only 
governments, but also national and international NGO umbrella bodies, thus 
find development NGOs to r-e a part icular ly id iosyncrat ic end unruly community. 
Yet NGO interests are sometimes served by surrendorinp a measure o f 
autonomy and selectively col laborat ing with other NGOs and with government. 
As small organizations acting alone, NQOs have l imited impact. Tinlike 
governments, NGOs usually lack the structure and resources to expand an 
e f f ec t i ve rural development experiment beyond the enclosed boundaries o f an 
i n i t i a l Project site. The t rans i t ion from micro-project to macro-program 
forces NGOs to undertake operations o f a nature and scale f o r which they are 
man ageri ally il l-equipped. Governments., by cor t rast , are'organized on a 
na-ticnal scale and, while the i r reach may not be i ee r , i t i s usually broad. 
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with at least a nominal presence in every administrative distr ict . The 
challenge f o r NGOs i s to gain access to larger amounts of resources for 
program rep l i ca t i on , without at the same time a l i o win'; governments to ''dilute, 
d is tor t or destroy whatever i s good in the technology or method" (Korten, 
1986). But rather than mechanically attempting expansion for its own sake, 
NGOs must be careful to i d en t i f y the correct lessons from pilot projects — 
what works where, and why — and a^apt programs accordingly. 
Se lect ive col laborat ion between NGOs and government is best worked 
out among f i e l d s t a f f at loca l l e v e l . In pract ice , government extension 
workers o f ten work c lose ly with community groups on projects that are 
supported f inanc ia l l y or technical ly by NGOs. Often such projects will be the 
most v i s ib l e evidence of development ac t i v i t y in a local i ty an'1 government 
workers may even display then as the i r own showpieces. The dividing line 
between government and. voluntary i n i t i a t i v e thus becomes blurred. Ideally, 
NGO and government workers negot iate a div is ion o f labour in the local i+jr 
iru comparative advantage o f each :r-ency Whereas NGOs are 
good at mobil iz ing and organizing community groups, government is often better 
equipped to undertake technical tasks. Both sets of function are required for 
the integrated and multi faceted task o f rural development. 
Interest ing examples •.' s e l e c t i v e col laboration between NGOs and 
governments at d i s t r i c t l e ve l can be found in most African countries. I w i l l 
c i t e three from Zimbabwe. NGOs cap tra in government extension workers in 
methods o f community organizing and resource mobil ization, as the Savings 
Development Movement ha;- clone with the Ministry of Agriculture. Where 
government s t a f f are thin on the 'round MGOs can organize, their clientele to 
receive government services in a roup s e t t ing , as the Adult Literacy 
Organization of Zimbabwe and the Zimbahw ? Women's Bureau have dome with t h e 
same Ministry. NGOs can ,-vcr. integrate the i r support systems with government 
structures as S i l v e i r a Hour o has done in multidisciplinary agricultural 
development teams. 
Chambers has noted that NGO s t a f f who s e l e c t i v e l y work with local 
author i t ies may have exceptional opportunities to influence o f f i c i a l 
p r i o r i t i e s , procedures an1 a c t i v i t i e s . They can be helpful al l ies fo i 
- 31 - I D S / W r HDD 
government f i e ld staff who wish to i n i t i a t e progressive change (Chambers 1987, 
11-12). For example, NGOs pioneered the use of paraprofessional auxi l iary 
workers in Africa, an approach now adopted by several African governments f o r 
primary health care, population planning, and agr icultural aservices at 
grassroots level . The most thoughtful NGO managers do not build up expensive 
f ie ld staf fs of their own but seek to "piggy-back" NGO programs onto ex is t ing 
government extension structures. In a part icular ly interest ing exneriment 
along these lines, the Uganda Catholic Secretariat has succeeded in par t i a l l y 
revitalizing an otherwise dormant government agr icultural extension serv ice to 
assist in the rehabilitation of war-damaged farming areas. 
NGOs in Africa have not yet been able to gain access to s i gn i f i cant 
portions of government development budgets. Public grants- in-aid to NGOs are 
usually meagre anc5 are restr icted to National Councils o f Social Services and 
the few selected agencies that work c losely with them. Some indigenous NGOs 
in Africa have attempted, to win core ins t i tu t iona l funding from the i r home 
governments, but with l i t t l e sucess. In Zimbabwe, f o r example, the 
Agricultural Finance Corporation welcomed assistance in administering seasonal 
loans to farmer groups from S i l ve i ra "ouse, a church-based t ra in ing center. 
But Silveira House was never able to convince government to nay a fee f o r such 
services. Indeed, far from awarding service de l ivery sub-contracts that would 
underwrite NGO operations, governments have usually sought ways to get NGOs to 
absorb part of the recurrent costs o f reaching the rural areas. 
Policy Advocacy 
Ideally, NGOs should have useful ideas to o f f e r to rural development 
planners. By demonstrating a l ternat ive methods o f get t ing things done at the 
village level , they can o f f e r useful po l i cy suggestions on questions o f l oca l 
resource mobilization, recurrent cost recovery, and program susta inab i l i t y . 
By documenting local experiences, NGOs can enhance the understanding of 
governments and donors on the l oca l e f f e c t s o f economic adjustment p o l i c i e s on 
various strata of the rural population. In an era when the orthodoxy in 
development policy gives emphasis to economic growth, NGOs may even help to 
ensure that issues of soc ia l jus t i ce do not s l i p , unnoticed, o f f the rural 
development agenda. 
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As NGOs endevryr to increase the i r scale of operations, they 
inevi tably led to the pol icy arena. Through analysis of success and 
f a i lu r e in projects NGOs may i den t i f y certain overarching conditions — such 
as pr ice or ins t i tut iona l structures — that are best addressed through policy 
reform. And once membership o f NGOs expand beyond the community group level 
into federated forms o f organizat ion, they also begin to accumulate polit ical 
c lout . NGOs may even adopt an e x p l i c i t l y po l i t i ca l agenda in which advocacy 
and development education are seen as oart o f the mission of the voluntary 
sector . A l l o f these factors require that NGO leaders become increasingly 
sophisticated at managing, a dialogue with the State on rural development 
po l i cy . 
In pract ice , NGO pol icy inf luence in Afr ica to date has been 
extremely modest. Greater impact has net been achieved for three reasons, 
each o f which points to the need f o r inst i tut ional strengthening within the 
voluntary sector . 
n r s t , N(ius in Atrica have been somewhat self-absorbed in the 
po l i c i es that d i r ec t l y a f f e c t the operations of the ' ' voluntary sector. NGO 
advocacy tends to begin with parochial, day-to-day concerns such as government 
reg is t ra t ion requirements, NGO duty- free pr iv i l eges , tax exemption for 
charitable contr ibutions, or access to "blocked" funds. Perhaps such a 
s tar t ing point i s appropriate. As many speakers noted at a major 
international conference held in Nairobi in October 1986, both the private and 
the voluntary sectors look f i r s t to government to provide a more conducive 
"enabling environment" f o r the i r a c t i v i t i e s . In this sense, NGOs which call 
for the l i b e ra l i z a t i on o f part icular regulations are contributing to a broader 
debate on development s t ra tegy . To date, African Governments have not 
general ly been responsive to ca l l s f o r the wholesale reform of administrative 
ru les , pre ferr ing instead to retain the discretion to make decisions on 
individual NGO applications • on a case-by-case basis. 
Nor have NGOs in A f r i ca yet found a way to convincingly articulate 
the i r views on broader development pol icy issues. Only in countries where 
there i s a strong commercial farmers lobby - - such as Zimbabwe and Zambia — 
are there precedents f o r po l icy formulation f o r the rural sector on the ba$ 
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of reconmsn ati^ns submitted by ncn-government ^ncies. In these places, the 
farrer unions' position papers on agr icultural oricint and land reform have 
decisively shaped government pol icy choice. I t i s therefore noteworthy that 
small farmer NGOs, l i k e the National Farmers Association of Zimbabwe (NFAZ), 
arc now seeking to do the same. Because the research departments o f 
government ministries do not produce much careful and useable pol icy advice, 
there is opportunity herr f o r a lar^e NGO ro l e . I t would be highly 
desireable for organizations which speak f o r the rural poor to be able to 
propose draft l eg is la t ion and issue public statements on pol icy issues that 
affect them. 
This brings us, secondly, to the question o f ins t i tut iona l capacity . 
Public rolicv analysis and advocacy arc demanding tasks that are well beyond 
the current staff capacity o f most indigenous NGOs in A f r i ca . To address th is 
weakness, the National Councils of Churches and National Co-operative 
Federations have begun to establ ish research and documentation departments and 
have embarked on s t a f f development programs t o upgrade professional standards. 
As an alternative means of attract ing the necessary expert ise , these NGOs are 
also initiating innovative co l laborat ive relat ionships with researchers in 
national universit ies. And, as NGOr involved in prima y health care in K >nya 
have found, the prospects f o r pol icy influence are increased when there i s a 
cr i t ical mass of experience that can be brought to bear in a part icular 
sectoral area. 
Direct policy inf luence by indigenous NCOs on African governments i s 
ultimately relate^ to the strength o f national "umbrella" ins t i tu t i ons . There 
these exist they are new and f r a g i l e and o-Ften lack a convincing mandate From 
the NGO community they purport to serve. In 19 84, Voluntary Agencies 
Development Assistance (VADA) was former1 to provide management tra ining 
services to NGOs in Kenya but was never able to win s u f f i c i e n t legit imacy t o 
speak with one vr icc f ° r a l l NGOs. Voluntary Organizations in Community 
Enterprise (VOICE) in Zimbabwe also lacks stature, here because member NGOs 
complain that i t s leadership i s not aggressive enough in ar t iculat ing common 
NGO concerns to government. Even church-based umbrella bodies , l i k e the 
Catholic Secreatariats end National Councils o f Churches, are not always able* 
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to carry a l l t h e i r members alone when they wish take a strong stance in the 
po l i t i c a l debates o f the day. The creation o f national umbrella bodies that 
can speak with a r e l a t i v e l y u n i f i e d vcica f o r the voluntary sector is an 
important • item of unfinished business in A f r i ca . 
F ina l l y , NGO's f ind that re lat ions with donors condition their 
e f f ec t i veness as po l icy advocates. Through dialogue 'with donors, NGOs have 
had more imnact in changing fore ign assistance Pol ic ies than in altering the 
behaviour of home governments. Partnership arrangements between indigenous 
and international NGOs are proving to be valuable channels for grassroots 
concerns to be ar t icu lated up the funding chain to the points of aid 
decision-making in the industr ia l i zed world. And indigenous NGOs are 
increasingly using the same channels to demand a greater share of 
decision-making power, f o r example, by engineering a shift from short-term, 
pro ject -based funding tc core ins t i tu t iona l support for lcn?-term programs. 
To the extent that donor funds underpin o f f i c i a l rural development ef fort in 
A f r i c a , NGOs also have a small measure o f ind i rect leverage on African policy 
makers through donor channels. 
But, paradoxical ly , the strength o f NGOs as seen 'y African 
Governments is .ilso the i r greatest weakness. Governments tend to value the 
NGOs large ly because o f the addit ional flows of development capital they 
a t t rac t . Yet the lonene^nce o r national NGOs on foreign funding undercuts 
the i r a b i l i t y to perform a- e f f e c t i v e oo l i c v actors. Governments can easily 
dismiss them as dancing tc the tune o f a fore ign piper with no legitimate 
r ight o f entry to the domestic pol icy arena. I f national NGOs in Africa a.re 
to become truly autonomous, thev w i l l have to take a leaf from the book of r 
community-level hGOs and eve.te f a r greater e f f o r t to building a domestic 
resource base. This i s important, not only in terms of economic e f f i c i ency 
and inst i tut iona l susta inah i l i t y , but in terms o f ensuring the accountabil.ity 
of indigenous NGOs to a domestic p o l i t i c a l constituency. 
Because o f the ins t i tu t i ona l weakness of the voluntary sector, the 
current s tate o f r l a y in the government-NGO po l i cy dialogue is decidedly 
one-sided. In r e a l i t y , the f i r s t task o f NGOs i s to get African government 
to take them seriously as po l i cy actors. For the rtoment, African NGO lea-
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have tended to chose a d i f f e r e n t i a l and accomodating approach. Experience has 
shewn that confrontation has caused governments to in t ens i f y administrative 
control. Eut b?cause they are o f ten the nly voice avai lable to the rural 
poor, the challenge f o r NGO leaders is to sneak p la in l y , res is t cooptation and 
build NGO institutions. 
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSION'S 
In order to draw conclusions about the current evolution o f 
government-NGO relat ions in A f r i ca , i t i s helpful to compare Afr ica with the 
contemporary situations in Latin America and South Asia. 
In Latin America, where mi l i tary dictatorships have general ly been 
the order of the day, the State has repressed ponular movements and inhibited 
progressive social change (Lendim, 1987; Frantz 1987). NGOs, by contrast, 
have cultivated direct t i e s with opposition po l i t i c a l groupings and have come 
out explicitly in favour of the restorat ion of c i v i l soc ie ty . NGOs have been 
extremely wary of close association with government f o r fecir that they would 
be used to legit imize an unjust social order. Recently, in the parts o f Latin 
America where a process of redemocratization i s underway new debates have 
opened upon the r i gh t fu l ro le of NGOs v is a v ' s governments. Ye t , even though 
the voluntary sector has begun to provide leaders fo r new democratic regimes, 
the basic relationship between N^Os and governments remains one o f deeo 
estrangement. 
South Asia has generally had a f a r happier history of government-NGO 
relations. Not only have governance systems been r e l a t i v e l y democratic, but 
incumtent regimes have usually given high p r i o r i t y to developing programs o f 
direct poverty a l l e v i a t i on . Governments have t r i e d to target rural 
development at disadvantage groups and have even been w i l l ing to place 
resources in the hands o f the poor. This has proved to be a recentive 
environment for the growth o f NGOs and f o r the emergence o f open col laborat ion 
and institutional l inkage across sectors (Tandon, 1987; Fernandez, 1987). In 
both India and Sri Lanka, f o r example, central and loca l governments have 
selectively transferred respons ib i l i ty f o r the management of development 
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programs to proven NGOs. And the NGO sector won major policy victory when 
in 1986 ( c h ) , the Government o f India f o r the f i r s t time wrote the allocation 
of government funding f o r NGO programs into i t s Seventh National Development 
Plan. 
The African experience with govemment-NGO relations l ies somewhere 
between the Latin American and South Asian extremes. African governments are 
neither as democratically responsive as the i r South Asian counterparts, nor as 
e f f e c t i v e at authoritarian control as Latin American military governments. 
And NGOs in A f r i ca s t i l l tend to be preoccupied with re l ie f or welfare 
programs. Unlike the more successful NGOs in South Asia, they have yet to 
devise economic development s t rateg ies that w i l l work for the poorest of the 
poor; and unlike the sophisticated rights advocacy organizations in Latin 
America, they have yet to f ind an authentic voice and pol it ical program. And 
because African inst i tut ions aro themselves embryonic, the relations between 
inst i tut ions are necessari ly f lu id and inc ip ient . In Africa, both the 
centralized. States and the developmental NGOs are relatively new structures 
md the l imi ts o f the i r popular support and managerial capacity have yet to be 
f u l l y tes ted . Wo can expect re lat ions to swing back an^ forth as each side 
probes to discover a workable set of inter inst i tut ional arrangements that 
suits Afr ican conditions. 
Although governments -.:nd NGOs may v e uncomfortable bedfellows in 
A f r i c a , they are destined to cohabit. To date they have usually been able to 
Negot ia te a cord ia l and non-confrontational relationship. Wisely, NGOs have 
not endeavoured to displace or supplant the development efforts of governments. 
For t h e i r par t , governments have acknowledged the supplementary contribution 
of NGOs to development, provided th i s i s not accompanied by attempts to seize 
public i n i t i a t i v e or reap po l i t c a ! c red i t . I have argued in this paper that 
government-NGO re lat ions are l i k e l y to be most constructive where a confident 
government with populist po l i c i es meets an NGO that wishes to pursue 
mainstream development programs in the nat ion 's heartland. Relations are 
l i k e l y to be most con f l i c tua l where a weak and defensive government with a 
l imi ted power base meets an NGO that seeks to promote community mobilization 
in a contested border area. Otherwise, re la t ions are likely to blow 
e r r a t i c a l l y hot and cold depending on the govern'-: .it's perception of the 
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national security situation o f the ray. 
Certain trends in goverament-NGO relat ione in A f r ica are nonetheless 
perceptible. A more "enabling" environment i s by no means guaranteed. As the 
voluntary sector 'rows on" continues to shoulder ever . 'renter respons ib i l i ty 
for servicing rural 3reas, so African governments w i l l increasingly seek to 
tighten control. Attempts to o f f i c i a l l y regulate NGOs are l i k e l y to in t ens i f y 
rather than weaken in the future1. Governments are l i k e l y to use a mix o f 
strategies, at the same: time seeking to dissolve theaassert ive and cooot the 
meek. Special e f fort wil l be made to improve monitoring procedures and 
strengthen o f f i c i a l coordination bodies. For the i r par t , NGOs w i l l f ind 
increasing di f f icul ty .in maintaining a low p r o f i l e and, in the i r own in teres t , 
will seek legal registration, but in f l e x i b l e forms such as no t - f o r - p r o f i t 
companies. In order to avoid merely responding passively to o f f i c i a l 
directives, NGOs will also have to i n t i t i a t e more act ive overtures to 
directives, NGOs wil l als have to i n i t i - ':e more act ive overtures to 
governments for selective col laboration and pol icy dialogue. Only with 
positive action wil l NGOs be able to help mould a supportive rather than a 
regulated, environment. 
One prediction is c l ear . The evo1 ving re lat ionship between 
governments and non-governmental organizations in Afr ica w i l l be influenced 
more by polit ical than economic considerations. Donors - - rather than 
governments — wil l be most l i k e l y to scrut in ize the claim that NGOs are 
ef fect ive at en. >1 development. En other words, any "shaking out" of NGOs on 
cost-benefit grounds is l i k e l y be inst i tuted by the funders rather then the 
hosts. Governments are l i k e l y instead to focus keenly on securi ty a f f a i r s , 
with situations of c i v i l d i sa f f ec t ion being l east conducive to a l i b e r a l 
attitude of African governments towards NGOs. Governments value the material 
contribution made by NGOs to inf lows of foreign assistance and improvements in 
rural standards of l i v i n g . 3ut these contributions are not indispensible. 
African leaders stand ready to sac r i f i c e the economic development programs o f 
individual NGOs i f issues of national sovereignty and s t a b i l i t y are at stake. 
This should not be taken to mean that NGOs have l i t t l e room to 
organize autonomously f o r development. The reach of the African State 
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routinely exceeds i t s prasp; few governments hav been able to construct 
organizational machinery at the v i l l a g e l e v e l ; especia l ly in the countryside 
there are large expanses o f unexplored space f o r NGOs to occupy. Tc the 
extent they g i ve ordinarv people an opportunity to participate in decisions 
and represent loca l in t e res t s , NGOs have an important ro le to play in 
po l i t i c a l development. They have the potent ia l to assemble scattered social 
groups into integrated social movements. I d ea l l y , they can o f fer access not 
only economic op>portuniti es, but to a broader understanding of a citizen's 
r ights and duties under the law. By building independent organizations at the 
community, regional and national l e v e l s , NGOs in Afr ica have already helped to 
populate and p lura l i ze the inst i tut ional landscape. As such, their impact 
should be evaluated, not purely in terms o f economic growth and social 
wel fare , but also with regard to the strengthening o f c iv i l -society. 
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